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TEACHING A COURSE ON REGULATION OF THE
POLICE (WITH A SPECIAL FOCUS ON THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT)
Christopher Slobogin*
The organizers of this symposium gave us the choice of writing about
effective assistance of counsel or about teaching criminal procedure. I've
decided to do both. This article discusses teaching the criminal procedure
course most often called "Police Practices," for which I write a textbook
entitled Regulation of Police Investigation: Legal, Historical, Empirical and
Comparative Materials.' Borrowing heavily from the Teacher's Manual for
that book, the first part of this article describes my general philosophy for
teaching the course. The rest of the article illustrates this philosophy by
describing how I teach students about the application of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel to the interrogation process and to the conduct of identification
procedures.
I. GENERAL PHILOSOPHY
Regulation of Police Investigation has several objectives, many of which
call for different types of materials than those found in other texts that address
the investigative stage of the criminal process. First, the book seeks to acquaint
the student with the world of the police. Many criminal procedure texts contain
little about this topic, apparently on the assumption that information about
police habits and attitudes is common knowledge. In reality, however, the law
enforcement ethos is complex and occasionally mysterious to those who are not
police. Without some understanding of this environment, discussion about
regulatory approaches may verge on the irrelevant. Thus, the first forty-one
pages of Regulation of Police Investigation are devoted entirely to historical
and sociological materials concerning the police and their practices, and
additional materials on this subject are scattered throughout the book where
appropriate.
"Stephen C. O'Connell Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law.
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A second objective I try to meet in the police practices course is to provide
the student with some idea of the various mechanisms that could be used to
regulate the police. In this country, we tend to assume that the federal courts
should be the source of most rules governing law enforcement. Yet state courts,
legislatures, police departments, and even international organizations provide
alternative, or at least supplemental, sources of law. Accordingly, Chapter One
of the book devotes space not only to the incorporation doctrine, but also
provides material on the revolution in state constitutional law, the possibility of
relying on domestic legislation and international treaties as regulatory sources,
and police promulgation of rules. Later chapters occasionally note legislative
and police enactments that attempt to implement or compete with court
decisions.
The subtitle to my book, referring to historical, empirical and comparative
materials, describes several other objectives. For a number of reasons, students
ought to appreciate the historical pedigree of current rules. Most obviously,
under our constitutional system, history helps us decide whether doctrines such
as the right to remain silent and the exclusionary rule are "fundamental."
History also improves our understanding of why some rules are the way they
are, and occasionally provides some interesting alternative methods of
regulation. While many casebooks ably treat the Supreme Court's cases from
the 1960s onward, only a few give students much sense of colonial and post-
colonial practices, and thus leave the impression that these rules were created
-almost out of whole cloth. In fact, as materials in the book try to demonstrate,
many of the issues we debate today have been around for centuries.
Until the 1970s, very little empirical work on the impact and legitimacy of
legal rules regulating the police was available. Now, however, several studies
testing various judicial assumptions about police and citizen behavior are
available, including research about societal "expectations of privacy," the
impact of the warrant requirement, the effect of the Miranda warnings, the
accuracy of eyewitness identification, and the efficacy of various sanctions
against the police. Regulation of Police Investigation describes much of this
work, usually in summary form, occasionally through longer excerpts. The
objective here is not only to give students the benefit of information that has
played an increasingly important role in both judicial and legislative decision
making, but also to provide an opportunity for them to practice, at least in a
superficial way, evaluating facts found in the form of "data."
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Another important objective of the book is to leave students with some idea
of how other countries regulate their police.2 We Americans tend to believe
that our country leads the way in the civil rights arena. But that is clearly not
true with respect to some aspects of police regulation (particularly in the
interrogation context). And, whatever its slant, information about practice in
other countries reminds us that our way of doing things is not inevitable; for
instance, judicial review, localized police forces and warrants issued by ajudge
are not the norm. Thus, the book includes descriptions of various practices not
only in England and Canada (which are the usual foreign reference points) but
also in countries like Australia, Denmark, France, Germany and India.
Additionally, Chapter One provides some background on systemic differences
between various criminal justice systems so that comparisons will be made with
the appropriate grain of salt.
A final objective of Regulation of Police Investigation is to promote the
lawyering skills of students. Most important in this regard are the problems, of
which there are one hundred twenty-three. The vast majority of these problems
summarize the facts and results of Supreme Court decisions, although a few
come from lower court opinions or are made up. Some of the problems are
probably best used as a springboard for discussion by the full class, but most
lend themselves well to role playing, in a manner approaching the reality of a
suppression hearing. I usually require each student to argue at least two of these
problems by the end of the semester, either as a prosecutor or as a defense
attorney. If the problem assignments are made well enough in advance, the
discussion is of higher quality than is typically the case, and the whole class
benefits. One professor who uses the book, Bill Williamson, assigns the
problems at the beginning of the semester, which he says "guaranteed students
would be prepared to discuss the problems in class and often enlivened the
class with the occasional hammy argument." 3 The rest of Professor
Williamson's class sits "in judgment" of the arguments, with one member
randomly assigned to write a one or two-page opinion resolving the issues in
the problem. "It made for lively classes and occasional fun.",4
2 In another article in this issue, Erik Luna makes a more elaborate case for teaching
comparative criminal procedure. See Erik Luna, A Place for Comparative Criminal Procedure,
42 BRANDEIS L.J. 277 (2004).
3 E-mail from Bill Williamson, Associate Professor, Lewis & Clark Law School to
Christopher Slobogin (February 4, 2002) (on file with author).
4id.
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A different type of practical exercise is provided by the more than one
hundred pages of materials connected with State v. Longstaff,5 found in the
appendix. These materials (from an actual case) not only give the students a
rich factual context for arguments, but also acquaint them with the typical
documents generated during police investigation, challenges to that
investigation, and the criminal process generally. I often require the students to
draft a five- or six-page memo arguing the issues in this case, due near the end
of the semester, and devote the last class to going over these issues. That class
not only serves as a review, but emphasizes the reality that, contrary to the
impression students get from reading appellate opinions, facts rarely come
neatly packaged.
A final lawyering exercise is the Negotiation Problem. This Problem,
which provides secret instructions to the defense and prosecuting attorneys,
requires students to negotiate over a possible guilty plea against the backdrop of
a number of Fourth and Fifth Amendment issues which, if resolved in favor of
the defendant, would probably lead to dismissal of the case. The idea is to
engage students in the strategic and predictive decision making which
prosecutors and defense attorneys daily undertake in our plea negotiation
system. This problem also introduces ethical issues relevant to the subject
matter of this book (ethical issues are also raised in two other places-Chapter
Two's discussion of warrants and Chapter Three's discussion of post-charge
interrogations).
A final comment about general teaching philosophy has to do with the
importance of "cases." Most other procedure "casebooks" live up to the name,
by including significant excerpts from scores of Supreme Court cases, as well
as from a smattering of lower court cases. In contrast, Regulation of Police
Investigation reproduces a total of twenty judicial decisions (albeit often with
less editing than is typical). My assumption is that, by the time students get to
this course, they have had plenty of practice deciphering appellate opinions.
Furthermore, in a subject area as politically charged and result-oriented as
police regulation, what matters most is what courts do, not what they say. Over
the years, I have found that, after carefully discussing the leading cases in each
area (e.g., Katz, Miranda, and Mapp), I often ended up using many of the
Court's subsequent decisions merely as examples-in other words, as problems
highlighting how the issues raised in the leading cases might play out. Thus, I
believe that by giving the students all of the relevant facts, as well as the result
5 SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 621-724.
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in each case, the problems give students access to the most important
information in the Court's "secondary" decisions.
Although it thus de-emphasizes the language in the Court's opinions, the
book tries not to slight theoretical considerations relevant to those opinions.
More so than some books, Regulation of Police Investigation lays out an
analytical structure that, given the Court's "common law" treatment of the
issues, would otherwise be indiscernible to the usual student. The chapter
headings and introductions following those headings attempt to give the
students a clear picture of the legal landscape so they avoid getting mired in
tracking down the black letter law and see immediately what the "fighting
issues" are. Furthermore, on many of these issues the book substitutes for the
often ambiguous and constantly changing formulations of the Court excerpts
from leading articles suggesting innovative conceptual frameworks.7 It is hoped
that this combination of approaches to theory is not only more intellectually
stimulating on specific points, but also less boring generally, since it represents
a break from the typical case by case analysis. Further, this mix of materials
may better accommodate different learning styles (inductive v. deductive, big
concept v. linear).8
To illustrate these various points, the following sections describe in more
detail how I teach the Sixth Amendment materials in the book, specifically the
materials on the Sixth Amendment and the interrogation process and the
materials on the right to counsel and identification procedures.
II. THE SIxTH AMENDMENT AND INTERROGATION
This section of Regulation of Police Investigation immediately follows
materials on Miranda.9 It begins with the majority and dissenting opinions in
Massiah v. United States,'° the case that first applied the Sixth Amendment to
interrogation. It then provides the students with three "Notes." The first,
entitled "Note on Sixth Amendment Analysis," lays out the caselaw on the
6 For a contrary view, see Arnold H. Loewy, Building a Better Casebook, 42 BRANDES L.
J. 267 (2004).
7 This is in contrast to Professor Loewy, who avoids including excerpts from law reviews.
Id. On the other hand, I agree with Professor Loewy that most casebooks are too lengthy. Id.
The average assignment in my class is fifteen pages per day.
8 For a description of learning styles, see David Champagne, Improving Your Teaching:
How Do Students Learn?, 83 Law Library J. 85 (1991).
9 See SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 433-48.
10 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
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three issues that must be addressed in determining whether a Massiah violation
has occurred: (1) whether the "criminal prosecution" to which the Sixth
Amendment refers has begun at the time the government elicits incriminating
information; (2) if so, whether the elicitation is deliberate; and (3) if so,
whether the defendant's actions indicate a waiver of Sixth Amendment rights.
The next part of the materials, entitled "Note on the Rationale for the Sixth
Amendment Approach," provides excerpts from an article by Professor
Tomkovicz contending that Massiah's application of the Sixth Amendment to
interrogation makes sense" and an article by Professor Uviller arguing to the
contrary. 12 These excerpts, which take up four pages of the book, are included
because neither Massiah or the Court's subsequent cases provide a clear
rationale for the law in this area. Next there is a note entitled "Note on Justice
Department Policy" which describes the Department's administrative rules
governing prosecutor participation in interrogation.'
3
To provide some idea of how these materials might be integrated, excerpted
below are two pages from the Teacher's Manual (bracketed language and
footnotes were added for this article):
The teacher might start discussion of the Sixth Amendment by contrasting it
with Miranda analysis: Why wasn't Miranda violated in Massiah? Is there a
difference between interrogation and deliberate elicitation (cf. Stevens'
opinion in [Rhode Island v.] Innis14)? And how does waiver analysis differ in
the two contexts with respect to deception (see Patterson [v. Illinois] 15)? Or
the teacher can begin with a series of questions based on [Moran v.]
Burbine'6 [which is the subject of the problem that immediately precedes
Massiah and that ends the section discussing the Fifth Amendment approach
to interrogation under Miranda]:
(1) Could Burbine have raised a Sixth Amendment argument against the
admissibility of his statements about the murder? The answer, of course, is
"James J. Tomkovicz, An Adversary System Defense of the Right to Counsel Against
Informants: Truth, Fair Play, and the Massiah Doctrine, 22 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1 (1988).
12 H. Richard Uviller, Evidence from the Mind of the Criminal Suspect: A Reconsideration
of the Current Rules ofAccess and Restraint, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 1137 (1987).
13 See 54 Crim. L. Rep. 2191, 2193 (March 9, 1994).
14 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
s 487 U.S. 285 (1988).
16 475 U.S. 412 (1986) (holding that incriminating statements about a murder made by a
burglary suspect who was given Miranda warnings were not rendered involuntary by a failure to
tell him his attorney had called, and also holding that lying to the defense attorney about police
plans to interrogate the suspect did not violate due process).
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no, because the Sixth Amendment right does not attach until "criminal
prosecution" begins, and Burbine had not yet been formally charged for
the murder.
(2) Why should that matter? Why shouldn't the right be triggered at the time
of arrest, for instance? Stewart (who wrote the majority opinion in Massiah)
might respond by saying the true adversarial process, where counsel is need
to help prepare a "defendant's" case, has not started until the point at which
the state has indicated it plans to prosecute. From the viewpoint of the
suspect, this line of demarcation seems a bit artificial, since interrogation is
interrogation, regardless of when it occurs. Uviller suggests that the time of
questioning shouldn't matter (albeit in an attempt to expose the emptiness of
the Sixth Amendment approach to regulating confessions). He argues that, if
a right to counsel is really needed during "adversarial" questioning, it is
always needed. The real reason arrest is not the trigger point, Uviller
suggests, is that an ambivalent Court wants to give the police a crack at the
suspect, but only a minimal one (i.e., between arrest and charging). In
"Lawyers, Deception, and Evidence Gathering," 79 Va. L.Rev. 1903 (1993),
Stuntz has elaborated on this point, arguing that criminal procedure rules
should not just attempt to regulate the police and prosecutors but also
"facilitat[e] the central mission of the criminal process-the separation of the
innocent from the guilty." Id. at 1956. As he notes, current Sixth Amendment
law "makes no sense if one sees the right to counsel as aiming to benefit
defendants as a whole, or even poor defendants as a whole. It does make
sense if the right aims to benefit innocent defendants primarily," because it
gives the government "a window for additional evidence gathering after arrest
without the presence of a lawyer." Id. at 1947. Put another way, "Sixth
Amendment doctrine seems to guarantee a lawyer as late as possible: early
enough to engage in productive bargaining, but too late to prevent
incriminating disclosures in the police station." Id. at 1948. (Stuntz also notes
that the same rationale justifies the current rules allowing easy waiver of
counsel under Miranda). Id. at 1948-49.
(3) Assume that, during his second interrogation, Burbine had also made
incriminating statements about the burglary. Would they have been obtained
in violation of the Sixth Amendment? Here, the answer is yes, because he had
been charged with the burglary (just as Massiah had been indicted on the drug
charges), and the Court has held, in Patterson, that deception about one's
attorney after prosecution is initiated infringes the Sixth Amendment right
(just as Massiah held that post-charge deception about whether one is being
questioned by the police violates the Sixth Amendment).
(4) Why does deception make a difference in Sixth Amendment cases and not
in Fifth Amendment cases? Because the Fifth Amendment focuses on
395
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preventing coercion (which, as the previous materials demonstrated, is not the
same as deception), whereas the Sixth Amendment flatly guarantees the
assistance of counsel in all criminal prosecutions. Further, Tomkovicz argues,
since deception is not permitted at trial, it should not be permitted at earlier
stages of the process where the Sixth Amendment is implicated; to say
otherwise would permit the prosecution "to exploit the temporal expansion of
the battle to regain the advantages of adversarial imbalance." Uviller, on the
other hand, doesn't agree with this equation of the trial and pretrial processes.
To him, trial counsel makes the prosecutor's job harder not by obscuring
evidence, but by forcing him to prove his case. The role of counsel
envisioned in Massiah fulfills no such salutary goal (see, in particular, pp.
441-442 of the text). Uviller agrees with Justice White that Massiah "is
nothing more than a thinly disguised constitutional policy of minimizing or
entirely prohibiting the use of evidence of voluntary out-of-court admissions
and confessions made by the accused."
(5) If there had been no deception concerning Burbine's attorney, but
otherwise the facts were the same (i.e., he still waived his right to an
attorney), would his subsequent statements be admissible under the Sixth
Amendment? Under Patterson, the answer would be yes, since he had
received the warnings. In other words, a valid waiver after Miranda warnings
waives fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. Uviller would agree with this
result; to him, counsel during interrogation, if necessary at all, is necessary
only to prevent coercion, and a valid waiver indicates that no coercion is
present. The presence of an attorney will not ensure accuracy (at least any
better than an audiotape), is not justifiable as a way of offsetting the
prosecutor's advantage (as noted above), and is not ethically compelled, given
the special context of criminal investigations. (On the latter issue, see the
DOJ regs on p. 444). Stevens, dissenting in Patterson, disagrees, believing
that the attorney can help the suspect make better "legal" decisions in the
quasi-plea bargaining atmosphere of interrogation (cf. p. 381 on the results of
the New Haven project; recall also Professor White's comments about
"offers" of leniency in exchange for a confession at pp. 416-417). Stevens
further argues that there is no reason to exempt prosecutors from the general
prohibition against lawyers contacting the other party without their attorney's
consent. In addition to Uviller's response to this point, consider Stuntz'
argument (in the article noted above) that applying the ethical rule in the civil
context with its wide-ranging discovery rules is not as likely to lead to
evidence suppression as in the criminal context, and thus the current failure to
apply it to criminal cases makes sense.
(6) Finally, what if... Burbine had asked for counsel at his arraignment on
the burglary charges, and the police [had subsequently] obtained statements
about the burglary...? The request for counsel [at arraignment] would not
396 [Vol. 42
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trigger Edwards [v. Arizona]17 and Fifth Amendment protection (see McNeil
[v. Wisconsin]"8 ), but it would trigger [Michigan v.] Jackson,'9 at least in
connection with the burglary charges. (The statements about the murder
would still be admissible, despite the initiation by the police, because the
Sixth Amendment right hadn't yet attached with respect to that charge). Does
this result make sense? The dissent in Jackson, like the majority in McNeil,
didn't see how a suspect who has asked for counsel at a preliminary hearing
could feel "badgered" at a subsequent interrogation preceded by warnings,
and thus saw no need to import Edwards into this situation. Uviller would
agree; where there is no coercion, there is no need for an attorney. But
Tomkovicz might say that a request for counsel at arraignment, even if
technically only a request for trial counsel, means that the defendant wants a
champion to equalize the trial encounter, and the prosecutor should not be
able to avoid that champion merely by moving the confrontation with the
suspect further back in the process.20
The final part of this section (all of which I usually teach in one class)
consists of three problems based on Supreme Court cases that parallel the three-
step Sixth Amendment analysis described above. 2' The first problem, Maine v.
Moulton,22 permits discussion of the definition of "criminal prosecution," the
second, Kuhlmann v. Wilson,23 facilitates analysis of the "deliberate elicitation"
concept, and the third, Brewer v. Williams,24 focuses on the waiver issue. Each
of these problems gives a detailed description of the facts and then provides a
one-sentence description of the Court's holding, occasionally adding
information about other cases as well. For instance, the problem based on
Wilson describes the facts of the case (involving planting an undercover
informant in the suspect's cell), asks the question "A violation of Massiah?,"
and then states "The Court held, 6-3, in an opinion by Justice Powell, that it
was not."25 It ends with a "compare" cite to the Court's decision in United
17 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
" 501 U.S. 171 (1991).
19 475 U.S. 625 (1986).
20 CIsToPHER SLOBOGIN, TEACHER's MANUAL FOR CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: REGULATION
OF POUCE INVESTIGATION-LEGAL, HisTORIcAL, EMPIuCAL AND COMPARATIVE MATERIAts 106-
7 (3d ed. 2002).
21 SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 445-48.
22 474 U.S. 159 (1985).
23 477 U.S. 436 (1986).
24 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
25 SLOBOGIN, supra note I, at 445-46.
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States v. Henry/6 (also a case involving planting an informant in the suspect's
cell) and describes the facts and holding of that case.
To provide some notion of how a problem might be argued by the students,
here is the passage from the Teacher's Manual pertaining to the Wilson
Problem:
Problem 92
Wilson
Prosecution: Unlike the undercover agent in Henry, Lee was not paid for his
information, and therefore had less incentive to elicit information from the
suspect. Furthermore, the facts indicate he was instructed to be, and was,
merely a passive listener. And even if he wasn't, if there was a "trigger" to
Wilson's incriminating comments it was the visit from his brother, not Lee.
Finally, if the police and Lee were after anything, it was not self-incriminating
comments, but information about accomplices, thus further distinguishing this
case from Henry.
Defense: There is no difference between this case and Henry; if anything there
was more "deliberate" elicitation here. It is naive to believe that Lee didn't
expect some consideration from the police if he reported the information. And
the combination of putting Wilson in a cell overlooking the scene of the crime
and placing Lee in it with him could only have been designed to acquire
information from him. Even assuming Lee never asked any direct questions,
he obviously worked his way into Wilson's confidence, and let Wilson know
that he needed to explain himself better. By the time of the brother's visit, Lee
had made himself a person in whom Wilson would confide.
26 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
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Comment: The students might be asked whether we should do away with the
Massiah doctrine and hold instead that use of informants be regulated by the
fourth amendment, as Uviller suggests in another part of his article. The
students can be reminded that, because of Lewis, Hoffa, and so on, this type of
government action is not a search or seizure. But it could be considered an
invasion of privacy. If so, what showing would police need for a warrant to
authorize placing Lee in Wilson's cell? Arguably, because the revelations Lee
may discover are likely to be intimate, a high level of probable cause is
required, analogous to electronic surveillance cases where the government
must show that other methods have been tried and failed.27
I[I. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT AND IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES
This section of the book28 begins with a short history of the right to counsel.
It first describes the development of the right in England, canvassing the virtual
non-existence of professional help in medieval times. It then makes note of the
seventeenth century rule that counsel could represent defendants on matters of
law but not fact and Parliament's extension of the right to counsel in treason
cases, and finally, in 1836, to most criminal cases. It then discusses related
developments in colonial America (in particular, the need to have defense
counsel as a means of combating the professional prosecutor, who did not exist
in England at the time) and in more modem times. After describing Powell v.
Alabama29 (the first modem right to counsel case) and well-known Warren
Court counsel cases, it excerpts parts of United States v. Wade,3° including its
footnote describing the fact that several European countries require counsel or
judicial supervision during lineups. 31 United States v. Ash 32 is then excerpted
almost in full, and is followed by two Problems, derived from two lower court
cases. The first case, McMillian v. State, held that police did not violate the
Sixth Amendment when they showed an eyewitness, post-charge, a video-audio
tape of a lineup in the absence of notification to either the defendant or defense
counsel.33 This Problem allows discussion of whether Wade (which held there
is a right to counsel at lineups) or Ash (which held there is no right to counsel at
photo arrays) makes the most sense. Reproduced below is the second Problem,
27 Excerpted from SLOBOGIN, supra note 20, at 108-09.
28 SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 487-99.
29 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
30 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
31 Id. at 238 n.29.
32 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
" 265 N.W.2d 553, 558 (Wis. 1978).
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along with the note that follows it and an excerpt from the Teacher's Manual as
to how it might be taught:
Problem 98
United States v. Bierey
588 F.2d 620 (8th Cir. 1978)
Bierey, formally charged with committing two armed bank robberies, was
placed in a lineup with four other males between eight and nine months after
the robberies. Bierey was the shortest of the five, and the distracter who most
closely resembled him had a mustache and sideburns, unlike Bierey either at
the time of the robberies or at the lineup. Four witnesses to the robberies,
positioned from 10 to 15 feet from each other, and instructed not to say
anything or point during the procedure, observed the lineup; three of them
later identified Bierey as one of the perpetrators. Bierey's attorney was
present and observed the procedure, but he was not permitted to: (1)
interview the witnesses prior to the lineup; (2) review their descriptions of the
robbers prior to the lineup (although he was entitled to these descriptions, as a
matter of discovery law, prior to the witnesses' testimony at trial); (3) be
present when the witnesses made the identification after the lineup.
Was Bierey's right to counsel violated? [The court held no.] Assuming the
court was correct, is there anything else Bierey's attorney could have tried to
do? Consider the checklist on pages 475-476. 34
Note on Discovery
As illustrated by the above problem, the defense is often barred from
access to prosecution witnesses until trial or just before trial. The traditional
reasons for barring earlier defense discovery of witnesses were outlined in
State v. Eads, 166 N.W.2d 766, 769 (Iowa 1969):
(1) It would afford the defendant increased opportunity to produce perjured
testimony and to fabricate evidence to meet the State's case; (2) witnesses
would be subject to bribe, threat and intimidation; (3) since the State
cannot compel the defendant to disclose ... evidence [protected by the
Fifth Amendment], disclosure by the State would afford the defendant an
34 This twenty-one item checklist, which is reproduced in the book at the pages cited, asks
questions about what witnesses are shown before the lineup, the makeup and conduct of the
lineup, and post-lineup procedure. See Center for Responsive Psychology, How Fair is Your
Lineup?, 2 Soc. Action in Law 9-10 (1975).
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unreasonable advantage at trial; and (4) disclosure is unnecessary in any
event because of the other sources of information which defendant has
under existing law [such as cross-examination of the witnesses the
prosecution chooses to present at the preliminary hearing, which is required
in many states and at which the prosecution must demonstrate it has a
prima facie case].
Nonetheless, some courts have permitted earlier disclosure when the defense
can show that hardship would otherwise result. Cf UnitedStates v. Algie, 503
F. Supp. 783 (E.D. Ky. 1980). Does Bierey present such a hardship? 35
The excerpt below, from the Teacher's Manual, sets out possible arguments
for the prosecution and defense in Bierey, as well as some other queries the
teacher could pose. The excerpt is particularly pertinent given the focus of this
symposium, because it raises several issues about how counsel can be
"effective" in this particular context.
Problem 98
Bierey
Prosecution: Counsel was provided the defendant and was in no way
obstructed from viewing the lineup. That he was denied access to the
witnesses and their descriptions is not a violation of the Sixth Amendment;
both the witnesses and their descriptions will be made available to him during
the discovery process, so the defendant is not prejudiced in his reconstruction
of the lineup or challenge of the witnesses. Similarly, there is no need for
counsel to be present during the witness identification; this latter event is like
the prosecutorial interview that the Ash majority clearly believed did not
trigger the right. Finally, as to the reliability of the identification, note that 3
of the 4 witnesses identified Bierey.
Defense: Without knowing the witnesses' descriptions, counsel could not
determine if the distracters fit those descriptions, something research indicates
is important (see p. 476). As a result, he was prevented from fulfilling the
role Wade envisioned. Being able to interview the witnesses prior to the ID
would have further enhanced his ability to ensure the distracters were
appropriate. Not being able to attend the actual identification meant counsel
was unable to observe any suggestions, conscious or otherwise, from the
prosecutor or between witnesses. Finally, according to the Social Action in
Law checklist (pp. 475-476), the lineup might well have been deficient in
3 5 Excerpted from SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 498-99.
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various ways (see, e.g., items 1, 2, 12, and 16-21),36 all of which could have
been prevented had counsel had access to the witnesses before the lineup and
during the actual identification. (Note further that this lineup definitely was
deficient in four other ways (see items 3, 6, 8, 15),37 although counsel had all
the information he needed to point out these deficiencies.)
Comment: This problem raises the issue of how active lineup counsel should
be. As Bierey indicates, the case law tends to hold that counsel should merely
be an observer. If that is all counsel is allowed to do, than Uviller is right that
videotape is just as good, or almost just as good. At the other extreme, counsel
could be allowed to force changes in the lineup and the identification
procedure, an approach which might prove disruptive and slant the
identification process too much in the defense's favor. The ALl Model Code
of Pre-Arraignment adopts a middle ground, allowing counsel to make
objections for the record, but permitting the police to conduct the procedure
as they see fit.38 If the ALl procedure were combined with clear regulations
requiring police to follow rules along the lines of the Social Action in Law
checklist or the New Jersey rules, 39 then it might be the best approach,
because counsel's objections that the rules aren't being followed might be
heeded. But what happens if, as in Bierey, counsel doesn't make appropriate
objections? Are they waived? Further, neither the ALl approach or the Social
Action checklist resolve the issues actually raised in Bierey. As the note on
discovery suggests (pp. 498-499), the courts are likely to be very reticent
about letting counsel interview witnesses, either before or after the lineup.
Whether the need for such interviews outweighs the first two concerns
36 These items read as follows: "1. Was the witness shown any photographs of the suspect
prior to the lineup? 2. Have the witnesses been shown prior lineups related to this case? 12. Do
any of the participants in the lineup differ from the original description given by the witness?
16. If there is more than one witness, did they have an opportunity to discuss the events of the
case? 17. If a positive identification is made, does the witness give a verbal response instead of
writing down the choice on a form? 18. Does the form lack a zero choice (a number
representing a non-identification)? 19. Is there anyone else in the lineup other than the one
suspect who could be a suspect in this or related crime? 20. Was the witness told in any way that
he or she was 'correct' or 'incorrect' in making an identification? 2 1. Did the officer conducting
the lineup suggest or emphasize any one individual through word, gesture, tone or number?." Id.
37 These items read as follows: "3. Are there less than six people in the lineup? 6. Do the
participants have different amounts and styles of facial hair? 8. Do the participants differ in
height? 15. Is there more than one witness present at the lineup?" Id.
38 Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Proc. § 160.7 (Proposed Official Draft 1975).
39 These rules are discussed earlier in the text. They can be found in Attorney General
Guidelines for Preparing and Conducting Photo and Live Lineup Identification Procedures
(2001), available at http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/commissionreport/nj-guidelines
_lineup.pdf.
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identified in Lads will probably vary considerably from case to case, and
courts have been reluctant to engage in such speculation.40
IV. CONCLUSION
The foregoing materials from Regulation of Police Investigation and the
accompanying Teacher's Manual illustrate several aspects of the teaching
philosophy outlined in the first section of this article: the problem-oriented
method, the ready provision of black letter law, and the de-emphasis of case
language. The problem method requires students to engage in the type of
advocacy they will employ as lawyers; teaches them the importance of facts,
precedent, and organized argument; and ensures that they are heavily involved
in the classroom discussion. The provision of black letter law is not meant to be
spoon-feeding, but rather simply replicates information that will be available to
the students as lawyers (from treatises and so on), at the same time it allows the
discussion to be more efficient and sophisticated than one which starts by trying
to parse the holding from several pages of case language. The emphasis on
facts and holdings rather than explanatory language gets students to focus on
those factors that will typically be the most important part of a case in this area
of law. As the introduction emphasized, however, the book also provides
materials that can support a number of other teaching methods: problems for
groups or the entire class; a negotiation exercise; materials from an actual case
that can be used as the basis for review or a memorandum; and the relevant text
of a number of leading cases (in these sections of the book, Massiah and Ash).
This article has also illustrated how a diverse array of materials can be
integrated into a course on regulation of police investigation. As the first
excerpt from the Teacher's Manual indicates, the Massiah discussion benefits
from references to the commentators (i.e., Uviller, Tomkovicz and Stuntz),
empirical information (concerning the use of interrogation as a form of plea
bargaining), non-judicial sources of law (the DOJ regulations), and close
analysis of the facts of Supreme Court cases (e.g., Wilson and Henry). A
similar array of materials enhances the discussion of Ash. For instance, the
teacher can refer to historical information (in particular, the seventeenth century
rule that counsel may only argue legal issues, which presumably supports the
holding in Ash), descriptions of identification practices in other countries
(which are provided in the footnote in Wade mentioned above), the law review
literature (e.g., the debate about when the Sixth Amendment kicks in, excerpted
40 Excerpted from SLOBOGIN, supra note 20, at 117-18.
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in the Massiah materials) and empirical investigations (operationalized in the
Social Action checklist and the New Jersey rules).
These multiple learning methodologies and sources of information make the
course on regulation of police investigation more informative, more realistic,
and more interesting.
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